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Redistribution through the income tax: the vertical and horizontal
effects of non-compliance and tax evasion
Abstract: This paper uses the unique Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) micro data to study the
equity effects of noncompliance.  We access four years of TCMP data, 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988.   The TCMP
data allows use to observe income and taxes before and after a tax audit. In order to generate a range of scalar
estimates of the redistributive impact of more complete compliance we employ the family of extended Gini and
concentration coefficients.   We find that the vertical equity effects of noncompliance are very small or negative;
however, there is a considerable amount of horizontal inequity generated by noncompliance and in this sense more
complete auditing of tax returns could improve the fairness of the tax system.
1. Introduction
The US tax income tax system is based on voluntary compliance.  Of course, compliance with the tax code
is imperfect. For example, the IRS recently reported that the estimated size of the tax gap in 1996 was 195 billion
dollars.  One way in which the IRS investigates the phenomenon of noncompliance is through the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). The TCMP is a special IRS examination procedure designed to
measure voluntary compliance with Federal taxes in the entire taxpaying population.  Recently, the IRS has allowed
limited access to the TCMP microdata. This paper uses the TCMP data to investigate the redistributive impact of
noncompliance.  Using the unique data of the TCMP we are able to address the following set of hypothetical
questions:  What impact would more complete compliance have on income inequality?  How would horizontal
equity be effected if the tax authorities were able to more fully implement the existing tax code?  What impact
would increasing the compliance rate have on vertical equity?
While we do not claim that the TCMP audits represent complete compliance, do believe that they
accurately represent the likely outcome of expanded compliance efforts.
 Stepping up compliance efforts will change
the redistributive effect of the tax system ;  our analysis provides estimates of the marginal benefit (cost) of
improved (reduced) vertical and horizontal equity.  In order to generate a range of scalar estimates of the
redistributive impact of more complete compliance we employ the family of extended Gini and concentration
coefficients of Yitzhaki (1983).
1
                                                          
1 Bishop, Chow, Formby, and Ho (1994) use the TCMP data to study noncompliance in a Lorenz dominance
framework.  The Lorenz curve, while the most general measure of inequality available, does not (directly) allow for
scalar estimates of the redistributive impact of noncompliance as presented here.3
2.  Measuring the Redistributive Effect of  Noncompliance
Let the reported income of an income unit be X and let the tax paid be T (which could be
modelled as t (X), where t (.) is a tax schedule).  Further, let unreported income be U and let the
correct tax be T + S ( in the case of schedule t (.), we would have S = t(X+U)-t (X)).
Let A and B denote any two attributes of an income unit (e.g. declared income, undeclared
income, tax due, etc.) and denote the concentration curve for attribute A with respect to the ordering of
income  units by attribute B by C A|B.  That is, for each p e [0,1], CA|B (p) is the share in the total SA going to the
100p% of income units who are the poorest in the distribution of B.  Denote the Lorenz curve for A by LA ( or
CA|A).
2
The raw data yields pre-audit Lorenz and concentration curves:
LX, LX-T and CX-T½X
for , respectively, before tax income, after tax income and after tax income relative to the ordering of income units
by levels of reported income before tax.  With unreported income included, and unpaid taxes deducted, the
corresponding post-audit curves are:
LX+U, LX+U-T-S  and  CX+U-T-S½X-U
The concentration curves:
CX+U½X and CX+U-T-S½X-T
will also be needed to measure compliance effects relative to the pre-audit distributions of income before and after
tax.
                                                          
2 There is, in fact, a slight problem here.   When two or more income units enjoy a common value of attribute B, say
b0, but different values of attribute A, then strictly, the concentration curve C A½B is not well-defined at percentiles p
which include some but not all of those having b0. For the empirical implementation of measures developed here, it
will be enough to define C A½B at deciles.  In each of the TCMP data sets used, there is in excess of 47,000 income
units.  In the 1988 data set, for example, there are 42,756 distinct values of before tax pre-audit income and 43,184
distinct values of after tax post-audit income.  Hence the errors introduced by and numerical integration and
smoothing procedures are unlikely to be fatal.  See part 1 of the Appendix4
The redistributive effects of the income tax, pre-and post-audit, are measured respectively by the distance
between the Lorenz curve for post-tax income, and the one which would obtain under a proportional
(distributionally neutral) tax with the same yield.  This latter hypothetical curve is of course the before tax Lorenz
curve, pre-or post-audit.  Hence redistributive effect measures the inequality reducing characteristic of the income
tax:
Pre-audit RE0 = LX-T - LX
Post-audit RE1 = LX+U-T-S - LX+U
The determinants of the redistributive effect of a tax system generally have been analysed by Kakwani (1984).  A
full empirical analysis of the determinants of pre- and post-audit redistributive effect, RE0 and RE1  in the present
context, can be found in Bishop, Chow, Formby and Ho (1994).
3
The audit has both vertical and horizontal impacts.  The vertical impact of the audit arises through the
modification of people’s relative income differentials - both before tax, by the inclusion of unreported income, and
after tax, by the inclusion of unreported income and additional tax due.  As an addition to reported income X, the
unreported income U will exert an equalizing impact if U is an increasing proportion of X in cross-section, and a
disequaling impact if it is a decreasing proportion.  Similarly, the impact of the audit on after tax income
differentials depends on whether the increment U-S to after tax income is an increasing or decreasing proportion of
pre-audit after tax income X-T.  The two measures following capture the vertical impact of the audit:
Before tax Vb = CX+U½X - LX
After tax Va = CX+U-T-S½X-T - LX-T
Each is ambiguously positive for all p e (0,1) if the relevant increment is an increasing proportion of income, and
negative if it is a decreasing proportion.
The principle of horizontal equity in income taxation demands the “equal treatment of
equals”.  We approach horizontal inequity caused by tax cheating by letting equals be defined by the tax law and
focus our attention on the reranking caused by noncompliance. Regarding “equals” as “equals before the tax law”, it
is clear that evasion and non-compliance generates horizontal inequities. That is, tax evasion reranks taxpayers in
such a way that those who are regarded as equals by the law no longer bear the same tax burden. Furthermore,
                                                          
3 See also the Appendix, part 2, where the relevant theory is sketched out.5
evasion and non-compliance affects horizontal inequity at any given money income level as well as to “equals
before the tax law”.
4
We therefore measure the horizontal impact of the audit by the way the ordering of income units is
modified - before tax by the inclusion of unreported income, and after tax by the inclusion also of additional tax due:
Before tax Hb = CX+U½X - LX+U
After tax Ha = CX+U-T-S|X-T - LX+U-T-S
Finally, the inequality effect of the audit is captured by the impact on the Lorenz curves of before and
after tax income of including unreported income and additional tax due:
Before tax IEb= LX+U - LX
After tax IEa= LX+U-T-S - LX+U-T-S
Each of these can be expressed simply in terms of the relevant (pre- or post-audit) vertical and horizontal
components:
Before tax IEb= Vb - Hb
After tax IEa= Va - Ha
The impact of the audit on redistributive effect is, simply, its net inequality effect or, net vertical impact
minus net horizontal impact:
RE1 - RE0 = IEb - IEb = [Va - Vb] - [Ha - Hb]
As this equation confirms, the loss of redistributive effect due to evasion and non-compliance is the difference
between the vertical impact which compliance would have and the horizontal inequity generated by non-compliance.
All curves and differences defined above are multi-valued measures, defined at percentiles p e (0,1) in the
relevant distribution of income (before or after tax, pre- or post-audit).  They are, of course, population statistics for
the TCMP data set, and they provide sample statistics for the economy-wide effects of evasion and non-compliance.
As global estimates, they of course raise problems of statistical inference, which we do not deal with here.
5  In order
to aggregate into scalar indices, we select a consistent weighting function w(p) for all measures.  The particular
choice w(p) = v(v-1) (1-p)
v-2, v³1, yields the parametric family of so-called extended Gini and concentration
coefficients of Yitzhaki (1983).
For the Lorenz curve LA and concentration curve CA½B generally, these coefficients may be written:






                                                          
4 Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) seek, more contentiously, to capture horizontal inequity in the tax system (if
any) by reranking effects upon the distribution of equivalent income.  Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994)
distinguish the pure horizontal inequity and reranking effects of tax systems (see the Appendix).  We find it very
persuasive that reranking in money incomes captures the horizontal aspect of tax cheating..
5 The statistical inference issue is examined theoretically in Bishop, Chow and Formby, 1994, where some
inferences are drawn from the TCMP data set for 1985, which is also one of data sets used in this paper.  In
particular, the vertical impact of evasion and non-compliance in the population of U.S. taxpayers as a whole is
estimated to be significantly negative in 1985 (see page 48).6





respectively.  Increasing the value assigned to the parameter v shifts the focus of the index progressively towards the
lower end of the distribution.  The value v=2 yields conventional Gini and concentration coefficients, representable
as areas on the Lorenz diagram.
In index form, our measures are as follows.  For redistributive effect, we have:
Pre-audit r0 (v) = GX (v) - GX-T (v)
Post-audit r1 (v) = GX+U (v) - GX+U-T-S (v)
For the vertical impact of compliance, we have:
Before tax nb (v) = GX (v) - CX+U½X (v)
After tax na (v) = GX-T (v) - CX+U-T-S½X-T (v)
and for the horizontal inequity generated by non-compliance:
Before tax  hb (v) = GX+U(v) - CX+U|X (v)
After tax ha (v) = GX+U-T-S (v) - CX+U-T-S½X-T (v)
The inequality effect of the audit becomes:
Before tax ib (v) = GX(v) - GX+U (v)
After tax ia (v) = GX-T(v) - GX+U-T-S (v)
and the decomposition, explaining the sources of change in the inequality reducing characteristic of the income tax
due to evasion and non-compliance, is:
r1 (v) - r0 (v) = [va(v) - vb(v)] - [ha (v) - hb(v)]
or, simply:
Dr(v) = Di(v) = Dn(v) - Dh(v)
3.  Empirical Results
The data for this study is the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).  The TCMP survey of
individual returns consists of a stratified probability sample of filed returns that are thoroughly audited to check all
information on the returns and relevant records that the taxpayers are asked to provide.  The examinations reveal
understatements and overstatements of income, exemptions, statutory adjustments, deductions and credits by
comparing what taxpayers report on their returns with what the IRS examiners determine should have been reported
on those same returns.
In recent years the TCMP survey of individual returns has generally been conducted every three years with
1988 being the most recent sample available.  The survey is a national random (weighted) sample of approximately
50,000 returns drawn from the population of filed tax returns.  The samples include all individual income tax7
returns, both business and non-business, with positive incomes for 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988.  A detailed
description of the TCMP data is provided by the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program Handbook
(1989).
 6
Table 1 provides the Gini (v=2), extended Ginis (v=1.5, 3.0, and 5.0), and concentration indices for
alternative income concepts and taxpayer unit orderings.
7  The first two entries, the pretax (GX) and post-tax (GX-T)
Gini coefficients, are based on unaudited incomes and are commonly used to evaluate changes in income inequality
and tax progressivity.  Column entries 3 and 4 provide the Gini coefficients based on audited incomes, where GX+U
is the audited pretax Gini and GX+U-T-S is the audited  post-tax Gini. Column 5 provides the pre-audit, post -tax
concentration index, CX-T|X ,which differs from GX-T by  maintaining  the pretax ordering.  Column 6 presents CX+U|X,
, which differs from GX+U in that the concentration Gini maintains the unaudited income positions.   Column 7 gives,
CX+U-T-S|X+U , which is post audit income ordered by actual income, X+U.  Finally, column 8 provides post audit
income ordered by preaudit income, CX+U-T-S|X-T .
  Table 1 provides all the data necessary to evaluate the inequality, vertical, and horizontal effects of the
TCMP audit.  We use the (extended) Ginis  of Table 1 (columns 1-4) to examine the impact of taxes and audits on
inequality and changes in inequality over time.  We create a separate table, Table 2, in order to examine the
redistributive effects.  The first row for each year provides the ordinary Gini coefficients (v = 2).  Following the
ordinary Gini in each year are the extended Ginis based on alternative weighting parameters, v.
We begin by examining the impact of taxes on inequality.  The Ginis based on the TCMP data are larger
than those typically reported by the Census Bureau. This is because the TCMP data include some very large
incomes.  As expected, all of the Ginis reported in Table 1 increase over time.  For example, the Gini for post-tax
incomes rises from 0.4671 in 1979 to 0.5276 in 1988.  Not surprisingly, federal income taxes reduce income
inequality--the post-tax Gini of column 2 is smaller than the pretax Gini of column 1.  In addition, we find that the
inclusion of unreported income has no measurable effect on income inequality.  The differences between the pretax
unaudited Gini (column 1) and the pretax audited Gini (column 3) are negligible for all v's and all four years
                                                          
6 Several caveats concerning the TCMP data warrant emphasis.  First, the sample is restricted to taxpayers who file
returns.  Second, tax evaders often camouflage their activities and the TCMP audits do not uncover all of the tax
evasion that is taking place.  Finally, the TCMP audit does not include income and tax liabilities stemming from
illegal activities.
7   The Ginis, extended Ginis and concentration indices are estimated from the percentile data given in Bishop,
Chow, Formby, and Ho (1994) and additional similar author calculations using a cubic spline smoothing  procedure.8
considered.  Finally, the inclusion of both unreported income and additional taxes owed also has a negligible impact
on inequality, as the differences in column 2 and 4 are very small for all v's and all years considered.
Table 2 uses the (extended) Gini and concentration indices from Table 1 to construct distribution sensitive
measures of the vertical, horizontal, and net redistributive effects of evasion and noncompliance.  Columns 1 and 2
provide estimates of the net redistributive effect (NRE) of federal income taxes, pre and post audit.  Columns 3 and
4 provide estimates of the vertical inequity (VE) of noncompliance, both before and after taxes.  Columns 5 and 6
provide estimates of the horizontal inequity (HE) of noncompliance.  Finally, columns 7, 8, and 9 provide the
changes in the redistributive, vertical, and horizontal effects associated with the TCMP audits.
As expected, the NRE (columns 1 and 2) of federal taxes is positive. Both pre and post audit, the NRE rises
with v (as more weight is placed on the bottom of the income distribution) up to 3.0, then falls between 3.0 and 5.0.
While there are some (mostly small) differences in the magnitude of the NRE estimates over time, the effect of
changing v is the same for each year.
 As noted above, the net redistributive effect can be decomposed into vertical and horizontal equity effects.
Columns 3 and 4 show that noncompliance reduces the vertical equity of the tax system.   Column 3 shows the
vertical equity effects of incorporating unreported income into pretax income. All entries in column 3 are positive
implying that adding in unreported income improves vertical equity.
8  Column 4 shows the vertical equity effects of
incorporating both unreported income and additional taxes owed into post-tax income.  Adding additional taxes to
unreported income also improves vertical equity.  Increasing the inequality aversion parameter, v, generally results
in an increase in VE, both before and after taxes.  The exception to this finding is for v > 3.0 in 1988.
Column 5 shows the impact on horizontal inequity of incorporating unreported income into pretax income.
The negative entries in column 5 indicate that adding unreported incomes reduces the horizontal inequity in the tax
system.  The entries in column 6 are also all negative, implying that reducing noncompliance on an after tax basis
would also reduce horizontal inequity.  The impact on horizontal equity of changing the weighting parameter is also
unambiguous; as v increases (i.e., more weight is given to the lower incomes) we find in all cases a decrease in
horizontal inequity.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
A v value of less than 2.0 puts less weight on transfers among the poor than the ordinary Gini , while a v value
greater than 2.0 puts more weight on transfers among the rich than the ordinary Gini.
8  This conclusion is based on accepting the extended Gini as the correct measure of inequality.  Bishop, Chow, and
Formby (1994) use the TCMP data to illustrate stochastic dominance tests and find that taxpayers in the first decile
underreport a larger than average share of their income.9
Columns 7, 8, and 9 provide the changes in the redistributive, vertical, and horizontal effects associated
with the TCMP audits.  Our primary focus in on column 7--the change in NRE due to the audit.  Recall that the NRE
is simply the vertical equity VE effect minus the change in HE.   In Table 2 this implies that column 7 is the
difference between column 8 and column 9.
Table 2, column 7 shows that the changes in the NRE are all positive for years 1979, 1982, and 1985
implying that increased audit efforts would improve the redistributional aspects of the US tax system. However,
something appears to have changed between 1985 and 1988.  In 1988 we find little evidence that the TCMP audits
change the NRE of taxes, with the exception of the extreme value of v (5.0);  this implies that the largest
redistributional impact of the 1988 audit is among the lowest income taxpayers.
Columns 8 and 9 isolate the effects of tax audits on VE and HE.  Most striking is the finding that in nine of
the sixteen 16 cases the net effect of additional taxes on VE is zero or close to zero. There are also three cases in
1988 where the change in VE due to additional taxes is negative and not close to zero.  There are two cases with
relatively large positive VE effect, v = 2.0 in 1979, and v = 5.0 in 1988.  Finally, column 9 reports the change in HE
due to the additional taxes.  It is clear that for 1982 and 1985 all or nearly all of the change in the NRE is due to a
reduction in horizontal inequity due to reducing noncompliance.  For 1979, extreme values of v (1.5 and 5.0) result
in the change in VE being larger than the change in HE.  For 1988, an increase in HE is completely offset by a
decline in VE in three of the four cases, resulting in no change in NRE.
In summary, there appears to be a change in the portion of the income distibution at which the TCMP audits are
most effective in improving the equity of the tax system.   In 1979, the largest redistributional and vertical impacts
are in the upper tail of the distribution (see results for v= 1.5).  By 1988, the largest redistributional and vertical
impacts of the audit are in the lower tail of the distribution (see results for v= 5.0)  Evaluating changes in VE over
time and ignoring the extreme values of v= 1.5 and v= 5.0, we find that VE changes from near zero in 1979 to 1985
to negative in 1988.  This negative VE finding at mid range v's combined with a positive finding at v = 5.0 suggest
that most of the vertical equity gains due to the audits are confined to the bottom of the income distribution.
Finally, it appears that the largest, most consistent finding  is that the audits are successful in reducing horizontal
inequities due to noncompliance.10
4.  Conclusions
Tax equity is an important aspect of the design of any tax system.  One aspect of tax equity rarely studied is
the (in)equity of the tax system generated by noncompliance and evasion.  This paper uses the unique Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) micro data to study the equity effects of noncompliance.  We access
four years of TCMP data, 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988.   The TCMP data allows use to observe income and taxes
before and after a tax audit. To parameterize the impact of noncompliance on tax system equity we use the
generalized Gini coefficient.
To evaluate equity effects we consider both an inequality effect that I is generated by noncompliance, as
well as a net redistributive effect.  We further decompose the net redistributive effect into its vertical and horizontal
equity components.  We find while there is no inequality effect due to noncompliance there is a net redistributive
effect.  This net redistributive effect, which combines the vertical and horizontal components, is declining over time.
Much of this decline can be attributed to a decline in the vertical equity impact of the TCMP audits.  For the
ordinary Gini the vertical equity effects are very small or negative, resulting in most of the increase in net
redistributive effect coming from a reduction in horizontal inequity.   In sum, we find that there is a considerable
amount of horizontal inequity generated by noncompliance and in this sense more complete auditing of tax returns
could improve the fairness of the tax system.11
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Appendix
1.  Construction of concentration curves
When two or more income units enjoy a common value, say bo, of attribute B but different values of
attribute A, there are difficulties in defining the concentration curve C A½B at percentiles
p, which include some but not all of those having bo.  There are two alternative ways to remedy this problem.
First, we may define a lexicographic ordering, in which income units are ordered first by levels of B, from
lowest to highest, and second, at any given bo, by levels of A, again from lowest to highest; and then, for each p Î
[0,1], define ￿A½B (p) to equal the share in the total SA going to the 100p% of income units who come first in this
lexicographic ordering.
Second, if b1 < b2 < b3 < ... bn are the distinct values of attribute B occuring in the population, and if a
proportion pi of income units have B-values less than or equal to bi, we may define ￿A½B(pi) as the share in the total
SA going to those with b £ bi, for 1 £ i £ n, and use linear interpolation to define ￿A½B(p) for all intermediate values
of p.
It is clear from the construction that ￿ A½B(p) ³ ￿A½B(p) "p, with equality at p = pi, 1 £ i £ n.  Indeed,
￿A½B(pi) is the concentration curve which would obtain if, hypothetically, all those with any given B-value, bo, also
had the same A-value; and ￿ A½B(p) - ￿A½B(p) measures the disparity in A given B.
The various curves of the form C A½B(p) referred to in the text may be taken to be of either form,
￿ A½B (p) or ￿ A½B (p).  The two coincide at the mass points p = pi  through which, for the numerical integration
procedure used in the empirics, smooth curves C A½B (p) are fitted, and so it hardly matters: if the number of mass
points p = pi in the unit interval 0 £ p £ 1 representing the income scale is large, and the disparities observed at mass
points are small, then the extended concentration coefficient G A½B (v) computed from a fitted smooth curve CA½B(p),
lying between ￿A½B(p) and ￿A½B(p), will approximate closely to either of the formally correct ones ￿ A½B(v) and
￿A½B(v).
In each of the TCMP data sets used for the empirics, there is in excess of 47,000 income units.  In the 1988
data set, for example, there are 42,756 distinct values of before tax pre-audit income and 43,184 distinct values of
after tax post-audit income.  Hence the errors introduced by the smoothing and numerical integration procedures
used to produce our estimates of vertical and horizontal (non-) compliance effects are for the whole population of
U.S. taxpayers is unlikely to predominate over sampling errors.13
2.  The determinants of the redistributive effects of taxes RE0 and RE1
As argued by Bishop, Chow, Formby and Ho (1994), multi-valued measures of residual and liability
progression for the income tax may be defined as follows:
Pre-audit RP0  = CX-T½X - LX
LP0  = LX - CT½X
Post-audit RP1  = CX+U-T-S½X+U - LX+U
LP1 = LX+U - CT+S½X+U,
where C T½X  and C T+S½X+U measure proportions of taxes falling on percentiles of the relevant distribution of income
before tax.  As with all others, these two tax concentration curves may be of the ￿ A½B(p) or
￿ A½B(p) type.
The income tax system induces reranking among income units, in the transition from before to after tax.
This stems from differences in tax treatment (e.g. of single persons, married couples, itemizers, non-itemizers), and
is distinct from the reranking effects of evasion and non-compliance.  There is no inequity connotation since this
arises from society’s agreed upon method of determining taxable capacity, which is reflected in the provisions of the
tax code and IRS regulations.  The following measures capture tax system reranking:
Pre-audit RR0 = CX-T½X - LX-T
Post-audit RR1 = CX+U-T-S½X+U - LX+U-S
Following Kakwani (1984), the relationship between progression, reranking and redistributive effect can
now be specified, pre- and post-TCMP audit:
Pre-audit RE0 = RP0 - RR0 = [t/(1-t)] LP0 - RR0
Post-audit RE1 = RP1 - RR1 = [(t+s)/(1+u-t-s)] LP1  - RR1,
where the variables t, u and s denote the aggregate levels of tax paid, of unreported income and of additional tax
liability revealed by the audit, all relative to total declared income: t =  ST/SC, u = SS/SX.  The redistributive effect
of  the tax system is thus governed by tax level, tax progressivity and reranking.
9
The tax level determinant, [t/(1-t)] or [(t+s)/(1+u-t-s)], measures total taxes relative to total post-tax income, pre- or
post-audit, whilst tax progressivity measures disproportionality in tax payments independently of tax level. If the
measures in these multi-valued decompositions are aggregated as in the text, the following determinants of r0(v) and
r1 (v) are obtained:
                                                          
9 In Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), a careful distinction between concentration curves of the  A½B(p)-type
used in the analysis of redistributive effect is drawn.  If the former type is used to define the RPi and LPi measures, i
= 0,1 (i.e. taking descrepancies in people’s taxes into account in measuring the reranking effect), then a 3-term
decomposition of REi is achieved, i = 0,1, in which an extra term, involving a concentration curve difference of the
type  A½B(p) or  A½B(p)-type, appears.  In the case of a socially homogeneous population, this extra term captures
precisely the pure (classical) horizontal inequity characteristic of the tax system, i.e. the extent of the “unequal tax
treatment of pre-tax.”  In the case of a heterogeneous population, and, as here, analysis of non-compliance and
evasion conducted in money income terms, there is nothing to be gained by pursuing this form of decomposition.14
Pre-audit r0 = [t/(1-t)] P 0
k (v) - d0(v), and
Post-audit r1 = [(t+s)]/(1+u-t-s)] P 1
k (v) - d1 (v).
The tax progressivity index P 1
k (v) extends that of Kakwani (1977).
10  The index di(v) of reranking is that of Duclos
(1994).
                                                          
10 See Lambert (1993), page 175.15
Table 1
Generalized Gini Coefficients and Concentration Indices
Pre and Post-Audit, 1979,1982, 1985 and 1988
Year/
Parameter GX GX-T GX+U GX+U-T-S GX-U|X GX+U|X GX+U-T-S|X+U GX+U-T-S|X-T
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1979
v=2.0 .4671 .4363 .4658 .4324 .4352 .4590 .4320 .4273
v=1.5 .1760 .1495 .1763 .1443 .1457 .1711 .1440 .1407
v=3.0 .6254 .5933 .6227 .5892 .5931 .6137 .5888 .5816
v=5.0 .7595 .7315 .7563 .7276 .7315 .7457 .7275 .7166
1982
v=2.0 .4753 .4471 .4734 .4428 .4469 .4667 .4431 .4385
v=1.5 .1827 .1559 .1819 .1532 .1557 .1772 .1531 .1501
v=3.0 .6345 .6060 .6316 .6000 .6060 .6226 .6010 .5941
v=5.0 .7685 .7439 .7653 .7364 .7439 .7536 .7382 .7290
1985
v=2.0 .4871 .4608 .4853 .4567 .4602 .4783 .4567 .4522
v=1.5 .1937 .1680 .1930 .1656 .1674 .1877 .1656 .1622
v=3.0 .6455 .6199 .6427 .6140 .6191 .6335 .6140 .6080
v=5.0 .7758 .7543 .7726 .7468 .7536 .7609 .7468 .7394
1988
v=2.0 .5276 .5024 .5252 .4999 .5022 .5183 .4999 .4954
v=1.5 .2418 .2169 .2404 .2153 .2164 .2352 .2153 .2115
v=3.0 .6776 .6532 .6745 .6500 .6531 .6647 .6500 .6422
v=5.0 .7893 .7775 .7950 .7743 .7775 .7816 .7743 .7644
Notes:    Estimates are made using Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program micro data.  The measures are expressed in terms of changes in Gini and
extended Gini based indices multiplied by a scalar.  The variables r, n, and h refer to redistributive, vertical and horizontal equity effects of evasion and non-compliance, while v is
Yitzhaki’s (1983) distribution parameter.  When v=2.0 the measures show the effects of evasion and non-compliance on ordinary Gini indices of vertical, horizontal and redistributive
effects.16
Table 2
Extended Gini Index Measures of the Vertical, Horizontal and Redistributive Effects
of Tax Compliance and TCMP Audits -- 1979, 1982, 1985 and 1988































a.  v = 2.0
1979 334 308 81 90 68 51 26 9 -17
1982 306 282 86 86 67 43 24 0 -24
1985 286 263 88 86 70 45 23 -2 -25
1988 253 252 93 70 69 45 1 -23 -24
b.  v = 1.5
1979 320 265 49 88 52 36 55 39 -16
1982 287 268 55 8 47 31 19 3 -16
1985 274 257 60 58 53 34 17 -2 -19
1988 251 249 66 54 52 38 2 -12 -14
c.  v = 3.0
1979 335 321 117 117 90 76 14 0 -14
1982 316 285 119 119 90 59 31 0 -31
1985 287 256 120 119 92 60 31 -1 -32
1988 245 244 129 110 98 78 1 -19 -20
d.  v = 5.0
1979 287 280 138 149 106 110 7 11 4
1982 289 246 149 149 117 74 43 0 -43
1985 258 215 149 149 118 74 43 0 -44
1988 207 118 7 131 134 99 89 54 -35
Notes:    Estimates are made using the Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program micro data.  The measures are expressed in terms of
changes in Gini and extended Gini based indices multiplied by a scalar.  The variables r, n, and h refer to redistributive, vertical and horizontal euqity effects  of
evasion and non-compliance, while v is Yitzhaki’s (1983) distribution parameter.  When v = 2.0 (part a) the measures show the effects of evasion and non-
compliance on ordinary Gini indices of vertical, horizontal and redistributive effects.